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THE EFFECT OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXES
ON INDUSTRY*
LESLIE E. CARBERTQG
Tax Analyst, Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Motivated in part by a desire to increase incomes and improve the
living standards of the community, and in part by a desire to broaden and
diversify the tax base, manv state and local governments in the United States
have, in recent y'ears, devoted a good deal of energy to the problem of industrial attraction.
There arc many policies which may be used by state and local governments to induce industries to locate within particular governmental
jurisdictions. '\Vhcther the policies are selectively addressed to a number of
highly desirable industries or whether they are indiscriminately addressed
to all business enterprises, these policies are, at some point, concerned with
the factual question of why businesses select particular sites for their operations.
This article is concerned only with the tax aspects of these locational
decisions and represents an attempt to explore some of the policy implications of the business decision-making process.
In general, there are three methods by which state and local governments may attempt to grant tax concessions to potential industrial immigrants. By the first of these methods, the concessions are purely statutory
in character and take the form of a more liberal construction of the tax

laws in an attempt to create the appearance of tax burdens that are lighter
than those of competing jurisdictions. An example of such a statutory lure,

applied on a non-selective basis to nany types of corporate enterpries, is
the revision of the state income tax law to provide a less burdensome formula for the allocation of multi-state income.' A similar statutory device
may be more selectively applied through a special classification of cxcmptions under the ad valorem property tax.
By the second method, the concessions are purely administrative in
character and take the form of extra-legal negotiations between the tax
administrator and the potential taxpayer. Such administrative concessions
tend, of course, to be highly selective and depend upon the good faith
and the good judgment of the administrator for the determination of what
constitutes a desirable industrial activity and for the determination of
*'he present article is based upon a study conducted by the
Carolina Tax Study Commission in 1955-56.
**This article is not to be considered the official view of the
the author is associated.
1. The most recent example of such action is contained in
of the North Carolina Tax Study Commission, submitted to the
ber 15, 1956.

author for the North
company with which
the recommendations
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whether or not the concessions are truly necessary in each of the cases.

Although tax determination by administrative decision is common in many
areas of taxation, it is probably most importantly used in the administration of the ad valorem property tax, where the subjective processes of as-

sessment provide abundant elbow room for the assessor who is unimpressed
with his statutory responsibilities.
Finally, policies of industrial attraction might combine the statutory
and the administrative methods. Such policies begin with a delineation
by the legislative body of the broad outlines of the industrialization policy.
The administrative authority is given wide discretionary powers within these
policy boundaries, so that the final decisions, while justified by statute,
are essentially administrative decisions. These policies, too, are most commonlk associated with the incomc allocation provisions and with programs
of temporary property tax exemption which a number of state and local
governments have developed in recent years.
It is impossible to determine the extent to which the purely administrative concession is used as an instrument of industrial attraction. By
its very nature, such a method is rarely available for public scrutiny. But
a number of states have adopted constitutional or statutory provisions which
grant a wide range of industrial exemptions from the ad valoren property
tax. In sonic cases the exemptions apply to specific industries or specific
products; in other cases they apply to all industries or to a variety of products.
In some cases the exemptions are permanent; in other cases they are available for a specified number of years. In some cases the exemptions are
available to all enterprises; in other cases they are available only to enterprices newly located in the state. In all cases the exemptions have as their
purpose the creation of an atmosphere that will induce new industries to
enter the state and that will persuade existing industries to remain.2
There arc many grounds on which the use of a state and local tax
structure as an instrument of industrial attraction might be criticized. But
before any critical evaluation of such policies is possible it is necessary to
reach some conclusion, however tentative, as to the effectiveness of a program of tax concessions in stimulating industrial immigration. Even if the
policies arc judged to be highly effective they may be found to involve disproportionately heavy social costs. Final judgment must clearly be based
2. The following states have adjusted constitutions or statutes to provide for the
granting of industrial property tax exemptions at either the state level, the local level,
or both: ALA. CoD ANN. tit 51, § 6 (1940); ARK. CONST., amend. xii; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 9, § 8104 (1953); FLA. CONST. Art. IX § 12; Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.200
(1953); LA. CoNs'r. Art. X § 4; NID. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws Art. 81, § 8 (23) (1951);
MAss. ANN. LAws c. 59, § 5 (1953); Mlici. Comjp LAWS § 211.24 (1918); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 9703 (1953); N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. C. 72.12 (1955); Onto CODE ANN. § 5711.16
(1953); OHIo CODE ANN. § 5711.22 (Cur. Supp. 1956); OKxA. CoNsr. Art. X, § 6; R.
I. GEt. LAws C. 29,

58 § 412 (1950).

§ 4

(1938); ".WN. CONST. Art.

11, §§

28, 30; VA. CODE AN.N'.Art.

TAXES-INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
upon a consideration of both the benefits to be realized and the social
costs associated with the tools in question.
It is proper to begin with the a priori assumption that tax concessions,
whether calculated or not, are extremely dangerous. Unless they are strictly
confined to new enterprises, tax concessions must have one of two effects
upon the tax structure of any jurisdiction granting such concessions.' They
must either reduce the total revenue of the jurisdiction, thereby limiting
the ability of that jurisdiction to provide governmental services; or they
must result in a shifting of the total tax burden to the shoulders of other
taxpayers, thereby disturbing the equity relationships contained in the tax
structure.
Exemptions to particular property owners are demoralizing
to those who continue to pay taxes. Tax exemption means a subif all taxsidy paid by the entire community and it is doubtful
payers have a proportionate stake in the benefits. 4
And even if the concessions are effectively limited to new enterprises, the
possibility exisits that the relatively static tax base will be insufficient to
meet the new demands for governmental services which an expanding economy inevitably creates. If, in addition, the techniques of tax concession
rely upon the use of administrative power, rather than the extension of
statutory authority, the policies carry the somewhat more subtle but equally
potent threat of subverting the democratic processes which arc basic to
the fiscal affairs of a system of representative government.
In the face of these demonstrable dangers, the burden rests squarely
upon the proponents of any scheme of tax manipulation designed to stimulate industrial location to prove that the results will justify the costs.
In other words, it is necessary to prove that a sufficient volume of new and
desirable industrial activity will be stsmulnted to improve incomes and living
conditions to such an extent that a net social benefit will be produced.
As an introductory warning, it may be pointed out that the policies
in question are by no means the property of a single governmental unit.
In declaring its intention to pursue a policy of industrialization through
taxation, a government commits itself to a program of competition. In the
problem under discussion, it is not the effect of the tax burden of a given
jurisdiction upon the operations of a particular business enterprise that is
important. Rather, the important consideration in locating or relocating a
business enterprise is the effect of tax burden differences between competing
jurisdictions. An extended combat between taxing jurisdictions may thus
produce all of the fiscal costs and none of the economic benefits for any of
the competing governmental units, In this respect, the dangers are con3. See YASEEN, PLANT LoCArjoN, 180. Yaseen also considers the possibility of
adverse competitive effects of tax concessions on existing industry. These problems are
also treated by Snell, Tax Exemptions to Encourage Industry, TAxEs 383.

4. Seward B. Snell, op. cit. supra note 3 at 384.
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parable to those associated with competitive price warfare among retail
establishlmcnts.
iW

ECONOMIC TIHEORY OF INDUSTRIAL LOCATION

The effect of taxes on industrial location has long been a controversial
subject among economists and other specialists in the field of public finance.
EvCn businessmen responsible for making the locational decisions are far
from unanimous on why industries finally decide on a given location. However, there is substantial agreement at both extremes of the argument. It is
agreed that geographical differences in tax burdens do play some part in
the locational decision. Evcryonc is agreed that tax differences are not the
only factors determining industrial location. But between these two extremes lies the practical question of just how much influence geographical
differences in tax burdens exert in determining the location of industrial
activity.
On the surface, the problem appcars deceptively simple. It is part of
our traditional reasoning as businessmen that, for any given output, a firm
will attempt to minimize its total costs. Almost all of the taxes paid by corporations are considered to be costs of doing business. It follows, therefore, that taxes will be considered in the locational decision only to the
extent that they affect the costs of doing business at various proposed sites.
All of the costs are in reality expected costs, for in determining a plant
location an enterprise is more interested in its future than in its past. In
theory, too, the relevant costs are not merely annual costs, but a schedule
of costs over the expected future life of the property. Pure theory would
thus require the location expert to calculate, for each of all possible sites,
the present value of all expected future costs (taxes included) and to select
the site yielding the lowest figure. Such calculations would have to be
made for the entire company and not mcrely for that portion of the company represented by the new plant. The construction of the new plant may
change the operating relationships of the remainder of the enterprise and
markedly influence costs for other plants and for other corporate activities. This possibility is particularly important for the tax component because the construction of a new plant in one state will change the allocation ratios for the calculation of an income tax liability in all other
states in which the corporation is subject to income taxation.
Up to this point, the theory has been constructed on the assumption
that the type of product and the volume of onput of the new plant arc
constant. III order to make the analysis fully realistic it is necessary to
take account of the expectations of the cost effects of product changes
and changes in the volume of output.
This refinement may also have important tax implications. A state
which is suitable for a plant of a certain size, producing a certain prod-
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uct, may, from the standpoint of taxes, be undesirable if the plant is later
doubled in size or if the product is changed in some significant respect.
The planned new installation must not be considered to be identical in
all of its alternative locations. rhe architectural and engineering characteristics may have to be quite different in one location than in another. At
one site it may be necessary for the company to construct its own sewage disposal system or to install devices to prevent stream pollution. All
of these differences will be reflected in total costs. Similarly, it may be
possible to minimize the tax costs by designing the plant operations to
suit existing taxing districts or governmental authorities at each of the sites.
Thus, when the surface of the problem is penetrated, the theoretical
model for a "rational" decision on industrial location is indeed complex.
If only two alternative sites were considered, the application of the full
theory would require a sweeping realppraisal of the future of the total enterprise. But the economic theory of plant location requires the consideration of all possible sites. Every site is a possible site until the propcr
cost calculations have been made. Of course, for the great majority of corporations it is possible to narrow the choices to a fairly small number of
sites by simple observation. It does not require detailed calculations to
eliminate the Black Rock Desert of Nevada or the Golden Isles of Georgia
as potential sites for an automobile assembly plant. By simple observation
such sites may be ruled out on the grounds of clearly prohibitive costs.
'The extent to which such subjective elimination is practiced in actual cases
is extremely important in assessing the role of taxation in the locational
decision.
Although the economic theory of plant location may appear to be
more of a logical fantasy than a serious approach to a very practical problem, it does provide one important conclusion. From the point of view
.of the corporation considering a new location, the entire problem may be
expressed in terms of a comparison of costs. The geographical relationship
of the enterprise to its natural resources or to its market may always be
expressed in ternis of the costs of transportation to or from the point of
production. Only when it is felt that the location of the plant may influence the market by the advertising effect of a large production unit,
is it necessary to state the pro11m in other than cost terms.
In the cost comparisons of the locational analysis the tax dollar clearly
has the same authority as the transportation dollar, the labor dollar, or
the rent dollar. If, in parading its advantages, a state offers an abundant
market, the state is, in effect, offering low transportation costs to reach
that market. This cost advantage may be offset in any number of ways.
5,Somne corporations have, in recent years, given as one of the reasons for a
preference for industrial dispersion a desire to affect markets through the location of
plants by making people more aware of the company name and by adding, generally,
to the company's good will.
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One of these offsets may be a higher tax burden. Assuming that the tax ad-

vantage of one state is exactly offset by the costs of transporting the product from that state to the large market of a neighboring state, there is
obviously no net advantage for either state if the tax burdens remain constant. The point is, of course, that there is nothing unique about the way
in which taxes enter the corporate computation. If the dollar amounts
are the same and if equal certainty attaches to each, a state's offer of low
taxes is exactly as powerful as the state's offer of low wages, low transportation costs to the market, low transportation costs from the source of raw
materials. low rental changes, or low interest rates.
From the point of view of these theoretical beginnings, the role of
state and local taxes in determining the location of industrial enterprises
is measured entirely by the nagnitudc of the differences between the tax
bills at alternative sites. If labor cost differentials are greater than tax
cost differentials, it is clear that labor costs are more important than tax
costs in determining industrial location. If tax cost differentials are greater
than transportation cost differentials, tax costs are more important than
transportation costs. This argument does not disturb the conclusion that

it is the total comparison that is significant, for the argument simply grades
the component parts of the decision.
The conclusions, of course, will be different for each enterprise considered. For some types of enterprises transportation costs to the market
are inherently large. For other types of enterprises transportation costs
from the source of raw materials are inherently large. For other types of
enterprises labor costs are inherently large. For other types of enterprises
rental charges (actual or imputed) are inherently large. But in every case
tax budens play the sanie "negative" role as every other cost element in
the calculations.
The fact that this article is aimed at the significance of tax differentials
makes it possible to conclude that a number of enterprises are, on theoreti.
cal grounds, likely to be relatively insensitive to tax lures or to tax hardships.
The reasoning, of course, is simply that such enterprises are, by the nature
of their operation, likely to be relatively more sensitive to other costs. For
the most ]art, such enterprises are affected in greater degree by transportation costs. Thus, enterprises manufacturing perishable commodities feel
obligated to locate close to the market because the costs of refrigerated or
other preservative transportation are generally high. Similarly, enterprises
concerned with transforming bulky raw materials into compact finished
products feel obligated to locate close to the source of the raw materials,
because the costs of transporting the raw materials are significantly greater
than the costs of transporting the finished products. It is possible to construct a theoretical situation in which an enterprise normally attracted to
the source of raw materials could bc iduccd to movc closer to the market
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by tax differentials, but in many such cases the tax differentials would have
to be much larger than can reasonably be expected.
For certain types of enterprises it is safe to assume that differences in
transportation costs are likely to be greater than differences in all of the
other costs combined. For such an enterprise it would be possible for a
taxing jurisdiction to increase its tax burdens by large amounts without
offsetting the transportation cost advantages. Indeed, it is likely that the
tax costs could be increased to the point at which it would be impossible
for the enterprise to continue in business. In spite of this, it may not pay
the enterprise to change locations. Under these circumstances, the business
would simply cease to exist. In cases of this sort, taxes may not be considered to have any locational effect, other than that of determining whether
the business will operate at all.
The foregoing is a rough sketch of the theoretical arguments concerning industrial location. We conclude that differences in tax burdens
are just as important as comparable dollar differences in any other cost
factor. In theory, a particular site is selected only after an analysis of total
costs, so that the ultimate importance of tax burdens is determined entirely by the relationship between the size of the tax differentials and the
size of the differentials for other costs. On the assumption that businessmen behave with perfect rationality in their locational decisions, and on
the assumption that they are able to collect enough information to transform the theoretical model into a practical decision, the theoretical conclusions are incontestable. Debate on1the significance of taxes in the locational decision seems unnecessary.
DIwFICULTIES OF MEASUREMENT

Although the theoretical argument provides some important insights
into the practical problems of industrial location, the theory exists in too
rarified all atmosphere to be useful as an explanation of the manner in
which locational decisions are actually made. In the first place, business-

men are not always "perfectly rational" individuals. Partly because of intracorporate authority arrangements, and partly because of individual personality traits, businessmen sometimes are guided by emotional considcrations, by untested prejudices, or by considerations of personal comfort or

advantage. It must be remembered, too, that rationality itself call be a
costly luxury. If all of the logical requirements of the theory were to be
fulfilled in practice, it would be necessary for the firm to employ an army
of expert "data-gatherers" and banks of electronic calculators. For all but
the largest enterprises such attempts at rationality are likely to prove highly
irrational.
The most serious limitations of the practical application of the theory
of industrial location conics from the fact that detailed study of the data is
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virtually impossible, especially in the field of state and local taxation. The
difficulty is not merely that of being unable to plan for a definite set of
tax costs over a long period of time. The difficulty is that of being unable
to determine, with reasonable certainty, the first year's tax costs. It is this
difficulty that provides the most important distinction bctwcen the tax costs
and the non-tax costs. It is generally possible to determine what the
rental charge will be before the bills have to be paid. And it is generally
possible to determine what the prevailing wage rate is and how this prevailing rate will be adjusted by the entry of a new enterprise. It is also
possible to determine the architectural and engineering requirements in
advance and to plan a definite set of operational costs for each of the potential sites. Transportation costs may be established without difficulty.
Only in the case of tax burdens is it impossible to make a definite pre-determination. Such pre-cletermination may be possible for some of the sites
on the lists, but a comparison of total costs is impossible unless there is a
definite determination for all of the sites.
The difficulties faced by the location expert in determining the magnitude of the tax differential between a series of alternative sites are exactly the same as the difficulties faced by the tax analyst in attempting an
objective measurement of the differences in intcrjurisdictional tax burdens.,
Briefly, the difficulties come from the fact that it is not possible to assume
that the tax burden implied by the law will be the same as the tax burden actually imposed. In many cases a good deal of discretion is permitted
the tax administrator. In other cases the tax administrator assumes discretionary power without specific statutory authorization. In still other
cases the law provides for tax relief if the taxpayer satisfies certain conditions. In some cases the law is precise and the administrator is inflexible.
In very few cases is it possible to examine the tax laws and arrive at a tax
cost figure in which great reliance may be placed, especially if the new plant
is going to change the character of the community.
Although all types of taxes are subject to the same difficulties of interpretation, the income tax and the property tax are undoubtedly the chief
sources of uncertainty. Through administrative adjustments to the formula by which taxable income is determined, and through arbitrary and inexpert appraisal practices, these taxes often give the lic to Adam Smith's
familiar canon that taxes be "certain.''7
In one other sense taxes tend to be less certain than do other types
of costs. All costs are, of course, subject to variation through time, and
all are, to a certain extent, unpredictable. But for the individual firm, tax
costs are probably unique in the degree to which they may fluctuate and
in the extent of their unpredictability. An apparently small change in the
6. These difficulties are discussed at length in a forthcoming study, CARBERT,
IMPACT OF STATE AND

LOCAL

'AXFS

IN NORTH

CAROLINA

AND

T

HE

THE SOUTHEASTERN

STATES, to be published by the State of North Carolina, Chapters I, VI and VI.

7. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIorcs, Book V, chapter 2 (Canaan edition).
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tax laws, involving virtually no revenue change for the taxing authority,
may have a very considerable effect upon the tax burdens of individual
enterprises. Changes in the growth pattern of the state or of individual
communities can bring unexpected problems of providing governmental
services, and hence unexpected tax problems, especially those concerned
with the many special purpose districts. Changes in the composition of
the legislature or of an administration, and consequent changes in the
philosophy or techniques of government, may impose tax burdens upon individual corporations totally different from those which were imposed
before the changes. Changes in non-tax costs are related to changes in the
economy as a whole. Changes in tax costs may be quite unrelated to general economic changes. A state with a low corporate income tax rate may
find itself in fiscal straits and be forced to double the rate. A state may
spend a decade reducing previously accumulated surpluses in a desperate
effort to maintain its low tax rates. When the surplus is turned into a
deficit the state may feel obligated to attempt "recovery" in one or two
years with extraordinary high tax rates. Property tax assessments may deteriorate for fifty years. The final discovery that the situation is intolerable
may result in a shocking revision. In a single year the ills of a long period might have to be corrected. The imminence of a radical departure
from the status quo is rarely obvious on the surface and is never indicated
by a simple examination of the existing statutes. Such changes are the
source of the inherent and unique unpredictability of state and local tax
burdens.
The fact that reasonably accurate tax differentials cannot generally
be calculated by a corporation interested in industrial location does not,
by any means, prove the unimportance of taxes in the locational decision.
The difficulties of measurement force state and local taxes to play a seeondary or a tertiary role. Thus, the corporation will typically esbtablish a
set of minimum conditions which must be met by the new location. The
probability is that taxes will not be on this minimum-requirelnent list.
Any number of factors may be considered to be of primary importance,
but it is probable that there are very few enterprises that would include
state and local tax differentials in the list of basic considerations. There
can be only two reasons for this omission; either tax differentials- between
jurisdictions are small relative to differentials in other costs, or it is impossible to calculate tax differentials with any confidence. In view of the
fact that some enterprises are known to exhibit sincere dissatisfaction with
particular locations because of tax differentials discovered after location,
it is here maintained that the only defensible argument for the omission
of state and local taxes from the list of primary considerations for the
majority of firms is the inability to discover the real differences in burdens
between alternative sites.
The statement of the basic requirements will, of course, narrow the
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list of possible sites by eliminating those sites which are obviously unsatisfactory. Even in this primary consideration, however, it is too much to
expect that management evaluate every site that could possibly satisfy the
basic requirements, unless, of course, these requirements are so unique that
they are met by a very small number of locations. As a result, many taxing
jurisdictions will not have an opportunity to display their wares. Some will
be eliminated because they do not offer the basic requirements. Others
will be eliminated because of the prejudices of management, or because of
the prejudices of the professional location experts. Others will be elininated because of the fact that human beings have been known to overlook

a good thing.
Once the list of possible sites has been narrowed to those which can
fulfill the basic requirements, there is likely to be a consideration of those
factors which are considered to be "desirable but not essential." The secondary consideration simply implies that these factors are known, perhaps
intuitively, to involve smaller cost differentials than those involved with
the primary factors. But still it is unlikely that taxes will be considered
in any clear, quantitative way.
Some enterprises may consider that the differences in labor costs emphasize the desirability of the remaining locations in the Southeastern
states. Other enterprises may consider that the differences in labor skills
emphasize the desirability of the remaining locations in the Northeastern
states. Still other enterprises may conclude that the costs involved in a
location in the midst of industrial overcrowding are too great. In any
event, a second process of elimination takes place. Once again, many taxing jurisdictions are eliminated before they have a chance to prove their
low-tax status for the simple reason that other more easily calculated and
more readily predictable elements are found to be undesirable.
By this argument, industrial location appears to be a process of elimination. Some sites are rejected because non-tax costs are known, by common sense, to be prohibitive. Other sites are rejected because non-tax costs
are known, by actual measurement, to be relatively high. But it would seem
that, until the final step, sites are not rejected because tax costs are known
to be relatively high. This kind of knowledge simply does not fit the pattern of state and local taxation. When everything else has been decided,
and when everything else has been found to produce equal advantages for
those sites which have not been eliminated, taxes are considered to be
the final deciding factor,"
The fact that tax differences are capable of only imperfect discovery
8. The conclusion that industrial location takes the form of a process of elimination rather than the form of a simultaneous solution of countless variables is suggested by McLAUCHLWN AND RoeocC, W iY INDUSTRY MOVES SOUTH, Chapter 3; and
again by Robock, Industrialization and Economic Progress in the Southeast, The South-

ern Economic Journal, April, 1954. p. 317-319. See also Harold C. Berry, Business
Location As a Factor in Tax Liability,

MANACEMENT

AND

TAXES,

92.
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would seem to be sufficient reason for relegating state and local taxes
to the role of final arbiter. But there is another reason which is embodied
in the observation that taxes are considered by many corporations to be
negotiable payments. There are few areas in the American economy in
which haggling and bargaining may still be practiced. The modem marketplace, with fixed prices, has taken over the bazaar. But state and local
taxes have fallen prey to the "fair trade" principle in a legalistic sense only.
Outside the law (although sometimes permitted by law) bargaining is still
possible. Furthermore, industrialization has been endowed with such an
air of desirability that, when a corporation presents a dozen possible locations in various states, and when the choice is made to rest upon tax concessions beyond the law, the corporation often finds itself bargaining from
a position of considerable strength. In this way at least part of the uncertainty of state and local taxes is removed in the final stages of the locational decision, however undesirable the results may be from the community's point of view."
To the extent that tax considerations are introduced at earlier stages
in the deliberations, they tend to take the form of a calculation of the obvious. In the same way that a site may be rejected because of an obviously
inadequate water supply, a site may be rejected because of an apparently
high tax levy. A high corporate income tax rate, an unfavorable allocation
formula, a high franchise tax rate, and high property tax rates, will tend to
prejudice the management against particular states or against particular
sites within a state. The results of such an incomplete examination may
be quite invalid. But they will permit the corporate officials to sift out
those states whose tax burdens appear to be high.
Faced with the monumental task of persuading a large number of
local tax assessors to disperse, for a moment, the clouds of mystery which
surround local assessment practices, and faced with the equally monumental
task of persuading a large number of state officials to generalize on the
subject of special determinations, a corporation in the beginning stages of
the exploration for a new location can hardly be expected to do more
than examine the tax laws and related material, and, perhaps, to conduct
a kind of hypothetical comparison.' 0 In such considerations the state that
conceals, however inadvertently, the low-tax elements of its tax structure
is clearly at a disadvantage. Conversely, the state that conceals the hightax elements of its tax structure has a clear advantage. The real tax advantage may, in fact, lie in the state that is rejected because its apparent
tax burdens are excessive.
The role of state and local taxation in the locational decision thus
appears to have at least two facets. If taxes are considered early in the ex9. This practice of tax determination through administrative processes is treated
briefly in Berry, op. cit. suptra note 8, at 94.
10. For a recent example, see Carbert, op. cit. supra note 6 , chapters Vi and VII.
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plorations, the calculations are likely to be of the obvious effects of the
state and local tax structures. If taxes are considered late in the explorations, it is probable that they will serve as the final element in the choice
between a number of sites which are otherwise comparable in their locational advantages. In this latter event, the tax calculations which form a
part of the final decision may be concerned only with the apparent differences, or they may be the result of extended negotiations in which several
taxing jurisdictions become competitive suitors.
Almost all state and local taxes levied upon corporate enterprises are
permitted as deductions from gross income in the computation of federal
income tax liability. \Vitli the present federal income tax rates, the absolute differences between alternative sites must be reduced approximately
48 per cent to provide a measure of the kind of tax differentials that influence tax location. Thus a difference of $1,000 in the state and local
tax bills of two taxing jurisdictions would, in effect, be a difference of only
$520 if federal income taxes were taken into account. lhe same thing is
true, of course, of other types of costs which arc allowed as deductions
in the computation of the federal income tax base. The magnitude of the
difference is further reduced by considering the effect of the new location
upon the allocation ratios and the state income tax liabilities in other
states in which the company operates. Although this feature of the problem is often neglected in locational problems, it can have extremely important implications for a company planning a large, new installation.
E'FFEcas OF TAx LURES ON INnUSTRIAL LOCATION

Mr. Philip Hammer has classified industrial development activities on
the part of governments as "instructive, constructive, and seductive.""1 The
"instructive" category covers informational and research services of all kinds.
The "constructive" category covers programs of public expenditure of all
kinds. The "seductive" category covers special incentives consciously developed to lure industry to a location in specific states or in specific localities. One of the most important of such lures is the tax exemption or
the tax concession. And of these, the most important is the plan whereby
new or expanding industry is granted a temporary property tax exemption
(usually a partial exemption) for a specified number of years.
Professor William 1). Ross, of Louisiana State University, has com-

mented, at the conclusion of his study of the effects of the Louisiana 10year property tax exemption program, as follows:
Theoretical analysis and empirical evidence presented in this
study coincide to support the widely held belief that the industrial property tax exemption will, under special circumstances, serve
as the deciding influence upon the decisions of management to
11. Address by Phillip Hammer, Carolina Symposium on Public Affairs, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, March 12, 1956.
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develop and to locate a new enterprise in Louisiana rather than in
another state. In such a case, the added employment, income, business activity, and the new tax base thereby created in the community where the plant is located and in the state may well offset
the direct and indirect costs of the exemption. Only in such a case,
however, can an economic justification for the granting of the tax
exemption be found. The results of this study indicate that such
cases are very few in number, that exemptions cannot be so selectively employed, and that the cost in terms of lost revenue entailed
in the granting of exemptions to all firms is great in proportion to
results. 2
Thus, as was to be expectcd from industrial location theory, temporary property tax exemptions may be instrumental in attracting some enterprises to the state granting such exemptions, but many enterprises that
would have located in the same state without such exemptions accept the
exemption as a gratuity. As a result, the technique "gives away" much more
than it needs to give away in order to attract industry. This excessive
beneficence can have only two results: (I ) it can result in lower governmental expenditures, or (2) it can result in shifting the tax burden to
other taxpayers. It may be argued that, to the extent that new industry is
attracted, there will be no loss of revenue but only a failure to gain revenue.
This argument is correct as far as it goes. But to the extent that the participating firms would have entered the state without the exempion, the
exemption represents an unnecessary failure to gain revenue. Furthermore,
while industry undoubtedly does not exhibit the same demands for direct
governmental services as do retail establishments and homeowners, industrial growth nevertheless brings the need for greatly expanded governmental
services of all kinds. If the revenue structure fails to keep pace with the
need for governmental services, there must, of course, be a reduction in the
level of such services.
If the level of services is maintained, the tax burdens that would have
been borne by the new enterprises would have to be borne by other corporate and personal taxpaycrs in the exemption state. It is important to
note that after the expiration of the exemption period the enterprise able
to obtain the exemption will be forced to bear the relatively high tax burdens in order to permit the continuing exemption for other firms who
enter later. The enterprise will, in effect, be helping to pay for its own
exemption. This pattern would certainly be apparent if the granting of
the property tax cxemptions served, by fractionalizing the base, to increase
the property tax rate. But adjustments to the excmption may take place
entirely outside the property tax area. It may be that the corporate net income tax rate will have to be raised to help carry the burden of the new
exemptions. In this case, the exempt firm will still receive a net advantage
from the property tax exemptions as compared with other taxpayers in the
12. Ross,
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same state, but the interstate advantage will be greatly reduced or eliminated altogether.
There are some reasons for believing that a good many businessmen
look with distrust upon temporary exemption schemes. The feeling is apparently strong that the level of governmental services will suffer or that
the tax structure will contain hidden devices to assure the artificiality of
the exemption. It is possible that the temporary exemption programs have
actually dissuaded some enterprises from new location in favor of states
with a declared policy of "fairness and equity and no free-rides."
Too little attention has been paid to the relationship between industrial location and governmental services, the relationship implied by Mr.
Hammer's "constructive" activities. On the significance of these policies
Mr. Hammer has this to say:
The 'constructive' aspects of Southern industrial development
are not usually recognized as part of the program. No state development agencies have responsibility for this type of activity-and yet
I personally believe that it is by all odds the most important factor
in industrial expansion.
The South faces the need for a tremendous additional investment in its public facilities-its streets, schools, libraries, parks,
water and sewer systems, and other physical improvements. It has
already made substantial investments, but the task has just begun."'
In some cases the insufficiencies of governmental services will force
the company to provide essential services for itself. Such basic requirements as fire protection, police protection, sewage facilities, water supply,
and even employee transportation facilities may have to be provided privately if they are not provided publicly. In a community in which such
services are missing, or in which they are inadequate for a large industry,
the low tax bills imposed by the community may not be considered to be
economic gravy. The substitute costs that would have to be borne by the
company may, in fact, more than offset the low tax status in a given location.
In other cases the insufficiencies of governmental services cannot be
remedied by private operation. Roads, highways, port and airport facilities
are among the services which must be considered indispensable to industrial location and which are almost universally recognized to be governmental in character. But industrial enterprises are more and more recognizing the need for governmental services which do not directly influence
the costs of business. Hospital facilities, parks, libraries, and other recreational and cultural facilities are often considered to be extremely important.
13. Hammer, op. cit. supra note. 12. These views are expressed by many economists and location experts as well as by many individual businessmen. The importance
of such governmental services is stressed, for example, by Mabel Walker, The Plant,
The Office, and the City, Tax Policy, August-September, 1955, p. 27. In an article
in Fortune, July, 1956, by Richardson Wood, the only reference to the locational
effect of taxes is in terms of the worry of the businessman that taxes might not "keep
up with the requirements for schools and streets and sewers", p. 128.
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A good system of schools for the children of company personnel stands
high on the list of primary requirements of many companies. It is commonly
recognized, too, that the values of a good school system extend beyond
the needs of company personnel. These values are, from the company's
point of view, the intangibles of community stability and social health.
If taxes are reduced at the expense of these services, or if the reduction in
taxes serves to delay the necessary expansion of these services, the result
may very well be a diminished interest in the community as a possible industrial location. To this extent, low taxes (at least, extremely low taxes)
may have exactly the opposite effect on the locators. They may, in fact,
drive industry away.' 4
CONCLUSIONS

There is thus no clear answer to the old question of whether state
and local taxes significantly affect industrial location. At the first level,
the answer depends upon the magnitude of the differences between the
tax bills of the sites inquestion. Even after the differences between state
and local tax bills are reduced by the proper consideration of the federal
income tax, it is apparent, by even a superficial examination, that fairly
large differences in state and local tax bills do exist.
These differences must be interpreted differently for different enterprises. For some types of businesses the tax differentials will be insignificant as compared with the differentials in transportation costs, labor costs
or building costs. For other types of businesses the tax differentials will
not only be significant, but, inall probability, constitute a determining factor. In any event, the tax differentials that are used in any but the final
calculations are almost certain to be hypothetical and superficial.
It is in the nature of state and local taxation that, without collusion
between the taxpayer and the authorities, certainty in the imposition is
virtually unknown. In the final stages of the decision-making process, it
14. It is possible to draw this interpretation from an extension of the findings of
a very interesting study by BLOOM, STATE AND LOCAL TAx DIFFERENTIALS AND THE
LOCATION OP MANUFACTURINc. The author makes use of a correlation technique to
test a number of postulates regarding manufacturing location and state and local tax
burdens. The author shows that "there is only a rather unimportant relationship be.
tween state tax collection levels and increases in manufacturing employment. But it

indicates that manufacturing employment increased most where per capita taxes are

highest." (p. 26) The probability that higher per capita taxes are related to higher
service levels may indicate the favorable attitude with which businesses approach areas
in which governmental services are adequate. In addition, the author found that "there
is no discernible tendency for growth in manufacturing employment to be depressed
where corporate net income and license tax collections are high." (p. 34, italics added)
Unfortunately, the evidence does not seem fully to support the conclusion that "state
and local tax collection differences from state to state as they presently exist are not
important to the mass of industrial location decisions" (p. 40). This may be true
when aggregate collections are considered, but it may or may not be true when corporate tax burdens are considered. The author's concern with "business taxes" does
not remove this difficulty, for he has included only those taxes which are exclusively
corporate taxes. He has not considered, for example, the effect of corporate property
taxes upon the corporate decision. See Carbert, op. cit. -upra note 6, chapters VI and Vii.
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may very well be that inany enterprises acquire certainty through the bargaining process. But even this apparent certainty must be tempered by the
possibility of a change in the law itself. State and local tax bills thus present
a greater problem of uncertainty to the corporate official than almost an'
other cost. It is this uncertainty that forces a consideration of the apparent
tax differentials. But even in this case, tax differentials must be compared
with the differentials in other costs before the locational analysis makes
any sense.
lus, the theory of industrial location is quite clear. It gives the
state and local tax burden exactly the same importance in the locational
decision as other costs, to the extent that the differentials between alternaive locations are of the same magnitude. But in practice the answers
are less clear. Experience suggests that state and local taxes are, for the
majority of business enterprises, of secondary importance at best. Unfortunately, however, state and local governments have tended to formulate
policy on the basis of the theoretical rather than the practical conclusions.
If the tax structure of a particular jurisdiction is shown to impose heavy
corporate burdens, as compared with those imposed by a competing jurisdiction, policylnakers tend to assume that a substantial tax reduction will
automatically provide the necessary attraction.
It is probable that much of this policy reasoning is based upon contentions advanced by enterprises already located in the state in question. The
contentions may take the form of an implied threat by such enterprises
to leave the state unless the tax burdens are reduced to levels comparable
with those which seem to be imposed by other states with "equal locational
advantages." Or the contentions may take the occasionally more forceful
form of a suggestion that other enterprises not now located in the state
but urgently needed in the industrial community will not seek location
unless the tax burdens are reduced to levels comparable with those which
seem to be imposed by other states. In either case, the arguments are
likely to be extremely effective in a state that is searching desperately for
new industry and seeking to retain the industry it now has.
Such arguments are, of course, a natural product of the desire of business institutions to reduce total costs wherever possible. Once a business
has located in a particular state the business has a clear economic motive
to attempt a reduction in its state and local tax bill, whether the expectation of this tax bill played a major role, a minor role, or no role at all in
the locational decision.

